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Risk as a Proxy for Race-. The Dangers of Risk ssessmn i
Actuarial risk assessment in the implementation and
administration of criminal sentencing has a long history in
this country-a long and fraught history.' Today, many
progressive advocates promote the use of actuarial risk
assessment instruments as part of a strategy to reduce the
problem of "mass incarceration." Former Attorney General
Eric Holder has called on the U.S. Sentencing Commission
to hold hearings to further consider the matter of risk
assessment and prediction tools in sentencing and parole.
The objective-to reduce our massive over-incarceration
in this country-is critical and noble. But risk assessment
tools are simply the wrong way forward. I argue here that
we should resist the political temptation to embrace the
progressive argument for risk-prediction instruments
because their use will unquestionably aggravate the already
intolerable racial imbalance in our prison populations.
The fact is, risk today has collapsed into prior criminal
history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for
race. The combination of these two trends means that using
risk-assessment tools is going to significantly exacerbate the
unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal justice sys-
tem. More generally, the use of actuarial tools is likely to
produce a "ratchet effect" on all members of the higher-risk
categories-whether along racial or other lines-with
highly detrimental consequences on their employment,
educational, familial, and social outcomes.2 For these sim-
ple reasons, we should avoid embracing actuarial risk pre-
diction and instead turn to race-neutral solutions to mass
incarceration.
There are, to be sure, political and strategic advantages
to using "technological" instruments, such as actuarial
tools, to justify prison releases. Risk assessment tools pro-
tect political actors and serve to de-responsibilize decision
makers. Given that we still today "govern through crime,"3
these strategic considerations are undoubtedly important.
But I think that this advantage is outweighed by the cost to
racial justice. In the end, we need to find better solutions to
reduce mass incarceration. Before making the argument,
though, let me start here with a few cautionary tales about
progressive arguments for prediction.
I. Cautionary Tales about Prediction
This is not the first time we have been tempted to use
a metric of dangerousness as a way to empty "total insti-
tutions." We did the same thing with our asylums and
mental hospitals in the 1950s, '6os, and '7os. That experi-
ment revealed a number of things, including one dramatic
consequence: the turn to dangerousness had a distinctly
disproportionate effect on African American populations.
The proportion of minorities in mental hospitals
increased significantly during the process of deinstitution-
alization. From 1968 to 1978, for instance, there was a sig-
nificant demographic shift among persons admitted to
mental hospitals. In a 1984 study, Henry Steadman, John
Monahan, and their colleagues tested the degree of reci-
procity between the mental health and prison systems in
the wake of state mental hospital deinstitutionalization,
using a randomly selected sample of 3,897 male prisoners
and 2,376 adult male admittees to state mental hospitals
from six different states.4 What their research revealed is
that the proportion of nonwhites admitted to mental facil-
ities increased from 18.3 percent in 1968 to 31.7 percent in
1978: "Across the six states studied, the ... percentage of
whites among admitted patients also decreased, from 81.7%
in 1968 to 68.3% in I978."5 As evidenced by Figure i, the
track record is damning: mental hospitals were dginstitu-
tionalized by focusing on dangerousness, and the result
was a sharp increase in the black representation in asylums
and mental institutions.
A second cautionary tale: selective incapacitation. Here,
it is important to recall that the development of selective
incapacitation in the 1970S had, as its explicit goal, the
objective of reducing prison populations. One of the leading
arguments for selective incapacitation, especially in Cali-
foria, was precisely the progressive case that it would lower
overall prison populations while reducing crime. As we
know, the theory of selective incapacitation, which traced to
the seminal research of Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio,
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and Thorsten Sellin, rested on the idea that only a small
subset of youths-in their study, 627 youths or 6.3 percent
of the cohort-was responsible for over 50 percent of the
total crimes committed by that cohort.6 The modern idea of
selective incapacitation, which was grounded on prediction
and risk assessment, grew from this insight: predict, iden-
tiff/, and lock up those 6 percent-and only those 6 per-
cent-and society could cut crime in half, while at the same
time reducing prison populations and correctional costs.
The only problem was how to identify the 6 percent who are
chronic offenders; and the solution, naturally, was to turn to
actuarial methods.
When Peter Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse issued
their RAND report in 1982-the report that set forth the
most fully articulated plan for implementing a strategy of
selective incapacitation using actuarial methods-they
made clear that the benefit of selective incapacitation was
that it saved money by reducing prison populations. Their
seven-factor prediction instrument 7 was attractive, they
argued, because it had the advantage of reducing the
prison population. Greenwood and his colleagues con-
cluded their study precisely on that note: "Increasing the
accuracy with which we can identify high-rate offenders
or increasing the selectivity of sentencing policies can
lead to a decrease in crime, a decrease in the prison popu-
lation, or both. Selective incapacitation is a way of
increasing the amount of crime prevented by a given level
of incarceration."
8
Now, it turned out that their prediction instrument
identified low- and medium-rate offenders, but was highly
inaccurate regarding high-rate offenders: 91 to 92 percent
of those scoring o or i-the lowest possible scores-turned
out to be low- or medium-rate offenders; by contrast, only
5o percent of those scoring 5, 6, or 7 turned out to be high-
rate burglars or robbers. 9 The authors nevertheless con-
cluded their study on an unwarranted optimistic note-and
Greenwood and Turner issued a follow-up revised report,
five years later, with a slightly different and more honest
tile: Selective Incapacitation Revisited: Why the High-Rate
Offenders are Hard to Predict.'"
It is worth emphasizing that the advent of "selective"
incapacitation and the deployment of these purportedly
refined actuarial tools anticipated the largest single increase
in prison populations in history.
With these cautionary tales in mind, let me turn then to
the central issue: the relationship between risk and race.
II. From Race to Risk: Prior Criminal History as a Proxy
for Skin Color
Risk, today, is predominantly tied to prior criminal history,
and prior criminality has become a proxy for race. The
result is that decarcerating by means of risk instruments is
likely to aggravate the racial disparities in our already overly
racialized prisons.
Suprisingly, but tellingly, it was not always this way.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, race was used
explicitly and directly as a predictor of dangerousness. From
their inception in the 1920S to at least the 1970s, many of
the prediction tools expressly used the nationality and race
of the parents of the inmate as one of the central factors to
predict future dangerousness. This practice ebbed in the
197os as a result of the Civil Rights movement and con-
stitutional developments in Equal Protection, but was nev-
ertheless replaced with two other trends-the narrowing of
the prediction instruments and the focusing of those tools
on prior criminal history.
The combined effect of these various trends has been to
turn risk into a proxy for race. The intermediation through
criminal history took several decades, but its origins pro-
vide the best clue to decipher the problems of our present
condition-and the dangers of risk assessment. The evo-
lution from race to risk can be traced neatly by examining
the factors used in risk assessment tools during the early to
mid-twentieth century. I will turn to that here.
A. Race as an Early Predictor of Parole Failure
The first parole prediction instrument that was ever used in
the parole decision-making process-the Burgess method
developed in 1927 and 1928 by Professor Ernest Burgess at
the University of Chicago-included the nationality or race
of the father as one of 21 factors that predicted success or
failure on parole." Burgess was particularly interested in
the question of national origin. In his study of 3,ooo Illinois
inmates released on parole, he discovered that "the smallest
ratio of violations [are] among more recent immigrants like
the Italian, Polish and Lithuanian," and "the highest rates
of violation [are] among the older immigrants like the Irish,
British and German."'" Burgess also observed, referring to
parole violators, that "[t]he group second in size was the
Negro with 152 at Pontiac, 216 at Chester, and 2oi at
[Joliet]."' 3 Burgess' model was implemented by the Illinois
Board of Paroles in 1933, and as a result, nationality and
race were used expressly as a factor in the prognasio that
served as the basis for the decision whether or not to parole
an inmate. Race and nationality, it was believed, predicted
parole violation.
4
The use of parent nationality, race, color, and other
ethnic identifiers, such as religious belief and church
attendance, was a continuous thread that wove through the
evolution of the parole prediction studies and instruments
at least into the 197Os. In 1931, Clark Tibbitts, the former
assistant to Ernest Burgess on the Illinois parole study,
replicated the Burgess method (using a sample of 3,000
youths paroled from the Illinois reformatory at Pontiac over
a seven-year period from 1921 to 1927) and included
"nationality of his father" as one of his 23 factors. Not
surprisingly, being "American (Colored)" was a predictor of
parole violation, and being "American (White)" was
a marker of success.' 6 The very next year, in 1932, Elio
Monachesi published his Ph.D. dissertation on predicting
probation violations and, like the others, included the
nativity of the probationer, the nativity of his parents, the
religion of the mother and father and probationer, and
church attendance as predictors.
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Nationality, race, and religion became staples of the
prediction research. Courtlandt Churchill Van Vetchen
included nationality and family religion in his '935 study,
Walter Argow included race and church attendance in his
model the same year, Elizabeth Redden used color and
nativity in 1939, and Bernard Kirby and F.J. Carney
included race in their studies in 1954 and 1967, respec-
tively. U.S. Attorney General Homer Cummings com-
missioned a large survey of parole practices in 1936,
reviewing over 90,000 federal parole cases, and specifi-
cally found that "whites had better records on parole than
Negroes."' 7
In terms of actuarial instruments that would actually be
implemented, Burgess, Tibbitts and Hakeem all included
race and nationality of the father in the prediction instru-
ment. I discuss many of these tools in Against Prediction,'
8
but failed there to mention whether the prediction instru-
ments included race. I remedy that in the Appendix table
here, which lists the major prediction studies and tools,
discussed herein, that were developed in the early to mid-
twentieth century in the United States. The table discloses
the use of race, nationality, or religion-and whether the
tools were actually implemented. The table reveals a con-
tinued use of race until at least the late I96Os. In fact, when
California began using a parole prediction instrument in the
1970s, it used an actuarial device that relied on race. The
first California "Base/Expectancy Score" narrowed in on
race and only three other factors-prior commitments,
offense type, and number of escapes.' 9
It is also interesting to note that the link to race was not
only always direct, it was also at times metaphorical. Clark
Tibbitts, for instance, in his 1931 replication of the Burgess
method, referred to "white marks" and "black marks." So,
he wrote, "A record of no work.., which shows a violation
rate of 38.5 percent would be an unfavorable sign or what
we have chosen to call 'a black mark,' while a good work
record with only 5.6 percent failure would be favorable or 'a
white mark.' The rates of violation either above or below the
average permit the factors to be listed.., according to
whether they are favorable or unfavorable, 'white' or
'black' .'"2 Not surprisingly-though one has to wonder
whether Tibbitts caught the lack of irony-being "Ameri-
can (Colored)" was a "black mark" and being "American
(White)" was a "white mark."'"
B. Narrowing on Prior Criminal History
The actuarial instruments ultimately evolved away from
race as an explicit predictor, but that trend was accompa-
nied by two others-and these too would have significant
race effects: first, a general reduction in the number of
predictive factors used and, second, an increased focus on
prior criminal history.
The first trend was fueled by Sheldon and Eleanor
Glueck. They developed the principal competitor to the
Burgess method in their 193o book, Five Hundred Criminal
Careers. The Gluecks conducted extensive investigation into
the lives of 51o inmates whose criminal sentences expired
in 1921 and 1922, and became strong advocates of reducing
prediction tools to a narrower set of factors. Theirs ulti-
mately focused on only seven factors.22 The competition
between the Burgess and Glueck methods generated a tre-
mendous amount of research from the 1930s through the
195os, and much of it was focused on narrowing the
number of factors in the models. 3 University of Chicago
sociologist and heir to Burgess, Albert J. Reiss Jr., strenu-
ously advocated limiting the number of factors in predic-
tion instruments, 4 as did Lloyd E. Ohlin, another
prominent sociologist who taught at Harvard, and Daniel
Glaser, who worked on the prediction tables used at the
penitentiary at Pontiac, Illinois, in 1954 and 1955. Begin-
ning in the 197Os, the federal government adopted more
narrowly focused parole guidelines. The U.S. Parole Com-
mission relied on the Salient Factor Score that used only
seven predictive factors (and the majority of those seven
factors related to prior delinquency). California adopted an
actuarial model, the Base/Expectancy Score, that narrowed
in on four factors. 5 The narrowing of the prediction
instruments can be visualized by plotting the number of
factors used in parole prediction models over time and
drawing a regression line through the plot, shown in
Figure 2.
The second trend focused the predictors on prior crim-
inal history as a proxy for future dangerousness. Practically
all of the prediction studies converged on prior correctional
contacts (arrests, convictions, and incarcerations) as one of
the stronger predictors of recidivism. What developed, as
a result, were more simplistic but easier to administer
sentencing schemes that relied predominantly on prior
criminal history.26 This new emphasis on criminal history
shaped not only actuarial prediction, but also sentencing
guidelines schemes. The federal sentencing guidelines, in
fact, turned to criminal history as a more effective and
simple way to predict future dangerousness after giving up
on more complicated prediction instruments.2 7 Like the
actuarial instruments, state and federal sentencing guide-
lines reflected the view that criminal history predicts
recidivism risk. This is reflected well in the views of Paul
Robinson, former member of the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission and a professor of law at the University of
Pennsylvania:
The rationale for heavy reliance upon criminal his-
tory in sentencing guidelines is its effectiveness in
incapacitating dangerous offenders. As the Guide-
lines Manual of the United States Sentencing Com-
mission explains, "the specific factors included in
[the calculation of the Criminal History Category] are
consistent with the extant empirical research asses-
sing correlates of recidivism and patterns of career
criminal behavior.
' 2
Most sentencing guidelines ensure that criminal history as
a proxy for risk plays a troublingly large role at sentencing
already. The expanding use of actuarial instruments in
sentencing, as well as the increased importance of criminal
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Figure 2
Number of Factors in Risk Assessment Tools
Number of Factors in Prediction Models
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Year
history in the instruments used in parole, will only com-
pound that role.
Whether prior criminal justice contact actually works to
predict high- or low-risk offenders remains unclear, espe-
cially given the failure of most research to account for the
nonrandom assignment to penal treatments. 29 But what is
clear is that prior criminality has become the predictor of
choice in sentencing. If anything, it has increased in
importance relative to other factors.
Current actuarial instruments vary widely in the num-
ber and type of risk factors that they include, but all place
heavy weight on criminal history. Unfortunately, reliance
on criminal history has proven devastating to African
American communities and can only continue to have
disproportionate impacts in the future. The reason is that
the continuously increasing racial disproportionality in the
prison population necessarily entails that the prediction
instruments, focused as they are on prior criminality, are
going to hit hardest the African American communities.
The trend in incarceration over the twentieth century has
been one of increasing disproportionality, as evidenced by
the graphic representation of the proportion of the carceral
system that is nonwhite (Figure 3).
In the end, the use of risk instruments focused on prior
criminal history is toxic. The consequence is unacceptable:
relying on prediction instruments to reduce mass incar-
ceration will surely aggravate what is already an unaccept-
able racial disproportionality in our prisons.
More generally, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, 30
using risk assessment tools produces a "ratchet effect" on
the profiled populations-whether along racial or along
other lines. Putting into effect actuarial prediction is effec-
tively like sampling more-or over-sampling, in social sci-
entific terms-from the higher-risk group. The resulting
1980 1990
sample set will contain a disproportionate number of those
higher-risk individuals-disproportionate, that is, as com-
pared to their representation in the offending population.
This imbalance will get incrementally worse each year if law
enforcement departments rely on the evidence of last year's
correctional traces-arrest or conviction rates-when set-
ting next year's profiling targets. The resulting ratchet effect
will have significant detrimental consequences on the
employment, educational, familial, and social outcomes of
the profiled populations-including, in the case of racial
profiling, the devastating effects associated with the notion
of black criminality that pervades the public imagination
and, in the case of recidivists, the extreme difficulties of
prisoner reentry. These high costs associated with any
ratchet effect should temper our embrace of the actuarial.
Assuming that people are only marginally responsive to
greater punishment, the use of actuarial methods would
impose excessive and counterproductive costs on all high-
risk populations and, overall, worsen the outcomes for
society.
IIl. Back to Square One
This leaves me, once again, against prediction. But that may
not be such a bad thing. What fueled mass incarceration,
research shows, was a combination of increased prison
admissions and lengthier sentences. John Pfaffs research,
for example, highlights the importance of increased
admissions in the prison build-up.3' Derek Neal and Armin
Rick have shown that increases in prison sentence length,
largely due to changes in sentencing law, are also important
reasons for the growth in incarceration.32 Bill Sabol's
careful analysis of the carceral build-up from 1994 to 2oo6
corroborates many of these findings.3 3 Although Sabol
identifies different mechanisms for violent versus drug
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Figure 3
State and Federal Prisons and Jail Population Ratios by Race
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offenses-the first associated more with increased prose-
cutions, and the second with increased arrests-the bottom
line is essentially the same: increased admissions, as well as
length of stay, account for sharp increases in imprison-
ment. All of these factors disparately affect people of color.
For example, Sonja Starr and Marit Rehavi's research
highlights the role of mandatory minimum sentences, and
prosecutors' disparate use of them in black men's cases, as
drivers of racial disparity in incarceration. 34
Rather than release through prediction, then, we need
to be less punitive at the front end, reduce sentence
lengths, and eliminate mandatory minimnums-while
remaining extremely attentive to the racial imbalances in
our sentencing laws. Further reducing the crack-cocaine
disparity would be a step in the right direction; however,
other immediate steps should include eliminating
mandatory prison terms, reducing drug sentencing
laws, creating additional diversion and alternative
supervision programs, and decreasing the imposition of
hard time. The real solution, then, is not to turn to the
actuarial, but to reduce prison admissions and
sentences.
Appendix. Major Prediction Studies and Tools Developed in the United States, 1923-1978
parents; religion of prisoner
Hart 66 Religion of prisoner being "other";
claim to attend church regularly
Witmer 15 [none]
Borden 26 Nationality; race
Burgess 22 Nationality of father
Glueck 52 Nativity of parents and prisoner;
religion; church attendance
VoId 34 (none]
Tibbitts 25 Nationality of father
Monachesi 54 Nativity of prisoner; nativity of parents;
religion of mother; religion of father;
religion of prisoner; church
attendance
From the Massachusetts Reformatory, 14 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 172-207 (1923).
Yes Hornell Hart, Predicting Parole Success, 41(3)
J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 405-13
(1923),
No Helen Leland Witmer, Some Factors in
Success or Failure on Parole, 17 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 384-403 (Nov. 1927).
No Howard G. Borden, Factors for Predicting
Parole Success, 19 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
328-36 (Nov. 1928).
Yes Ernest W. Burgess, The Workings of the
indeterminate Sentence Law and the Parole
System (1928).
Yes S. Glueck & E.T. Glueck, Five Hundred
Criminal Careers (1930).
Yes George B. VoId, Prediction Methods and
Parole (1931).
Yes Clark Tibbitts, Success and Failure on Parole
Can Be Predicted, 22 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 11-50 (1931).
No Elio D. Monachesi, Prediction Factors in
Probation (1932).
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Appendix. (continued)
Argow 37 Race; church attendance
Laune 54 [none]
Redden 22 Color; nativity
Survey of 82 Race of father; citizenship of father;
Release religion of father
Procedures
Jenkins 95 [none]
et al.
Weeks 14 Nativity of mother; religion of mothe
nativity of father
Hakeem 27 Nationality of father
Ohlin 27 [none]
Glaser 27+ [none]
Kirby 33 Race
Carney 14 Race
Hoffman & 66 [none]
Beck
Heilbrun,
Knopf &
Bruner
I0 [none]
Brown 10 [none]
1011 WILUH
Notes
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criticisms, and guidance on a prior draft.
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